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The very core of free speech in a democratic society is the right to engage in 
public debate on the political issues of the day. Surely at the heart of democratic 
citzenship are political advocacy and dissent, putting forward one’s own political 
ideas and criticizing others’, and supporting and attacking policies, parties and 
governments. Yet, it is precisely this kind of political speech so essential to a free 
and democratic society that should be denied to our judges.
Why should this be? The answer can be formulated in terms that will be all 
too familiar to Canadian judges: this limit on their free speech is reasonable and 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Let me proceed with the 
demonstration.
The objective of the limit is the maintenance of an independent and impartial 
judiciary — an objective of supreme importance in a liberal democracy. Liberty 
depends on enjoying rights under law. Further, when disputes arise about these 
rights, liberty requires that the dispute be adjudicated by a third party who is 
neither bound nor partial to either of the parties to the dispute. It is the 
judiciary’s function to provide such adjudication. To do so, the judiciary must be 
as independent and impartial as possible.
Judicial independence and impartiality cannot be absolutes. Judges, 
individually and collectively, are dependent in many ways on other parts of the 
state for, among other things, their appointments, material support of themselves 
and their institutions, and enforcement of their judgments. Nevertheless, a liberal 
democracy endeavours to maximize independence by establishing institutional 
arrangements and practices that protect the judiciary from any outside 
interference, direct or indirect, in performing their adjudicative function.
Although impartiality will never be achieved in an absolute sense, it would be 
a betrayal of the very ideal of enjoying freedom under law to abandon the effort 
to minimize judicial partiality. This effort is more easily made with respect to 
party impartiality. Judges with close personal ties to one of the parties are 
expected to disqualify themselves; if they fail to do so, they may find their 
judgments overturned on appeal for bias. Over the years, jurisprudence has 
developed determining which ties disqualify and which do not.1 Regarding 
impartiality on the issues -  as opposed to impartiality with respect to parties -  
there is a deeper problem of great importance which is much more difficult to
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overcome or minimize. It is precisely for this reason that judges must accept a 
limit on their freedom of speech.
Members of our society who are appointed to the judiciary are bound to have 
developed, before their appointments, well formed positions on many of the issues 
that bear on the interpretation and application of the law. These issues range 
from the relatively narrow policy or value choices embedded in particular areas of 
legal practice to broader questions of political economy and constitutional 
philosophy. Often in their pre-judicial careers, judges have taken strong public 
positions on these issues as politicians or as professional advocates. Even if their 
positions on questions of public policy or legal philosophy have not been publicly 
prominent, virtually all who assume judicial office will come to the bench with 
strongly held views on some of these questions. If we are to have a judiciary with 
both intellectual depth and public awareness, we surely would not want it 
otherwise.
We cannot expect judges on assuming office to shed their ideas on these issues 
as easily as they can — and should -  sever their professional and political 
associations with parties who may appear before them as litigants. Indeed, we 
would not want them to even try to forget everything they think they have learned 
about these issues prior to joining the judiciary. So, if it is unreasonable to expect 
judges to assume office without well formed points of view or to completely wipe 
their mental slates clean once they are on the bench, what can we reasonably 
require of them in this regard?
Our answer to this question must distinguish between how judges are expected 
to discharge their professional responsibilities on the bench and how they are 
expected to behave off the bench. It is in the latter realm that the question of 
judicial free speech comes up most acutely: to what extent should judges in their 
private lives as citizens be constrained from enjoying the freedoms available to all 
other citizens? Clearly, the constraints on judges qua citizens should be minimal 
and based solely on what is required to maintain their capability in the first realm
-  to discharge properly the distinctive civic and professional responsibilities of a 
judge.
So, what should we require of the judge qua adjudicator? While we cannot 
expect the total abandonment of all previously held opinions, we can expect from 
the judge a certain discipline in the way personal viewpoints enter into decision­
making. To begin with, we expect the judge, as a third party adjudicator in a 
dispute about legal rights and duties, to give full consideration to the submissions 
of both parties to the dispute — even if one of the parties represents a political 
cause or advances an argument contrary to the judge’s predisposition. Full 
consideration of both sides’ positions must be apparent and real. If this capacity 
for hearing both sides is not real -  if it is simply play-acting -  then it will not be
apparent for long. If it is not apparent, one of the parties will believe he or she 
cannot get a fair hearing in the judge’s court.
A second distinctive requirement of judicial decision-making is that judges be 
prepared to give reasons for their decisions which are persuasive to more than the 
judge’s immediate soulmates. I say “prepared to give reasons” because many 
judges — perhaps most judges -  do not have time under crushing case-loads to 
craft carefully reasoned justifications for their decisions. Nevertheless, even when 
the decision is rendered through no more than a few words from the bench, we 
expect that the judge could justify it by reference to an understanding of the law 
and the facts that goes beyond personal opinion or predisposition.
This last point does not mean that judges are expected to render decisions that 
are entirely “neutral”. The law itself is not neutral. Any legal system is full of 
value-laden choices about how citizens and governments ought to behave. 
Moreover, judicial development of the law cannot be a “neutral” process. The 
generality and the complexity of the law mean that there are inescapable 
opportunities for judges to nudge it this way or that in the course of interpreting 
and applying it. Without doubt, the backgrounds and predispositions of judges can 
and will make a difference as to which way the law is nudged. Yet, even accepting 
this hard core of judicial realism, we can require that judges be able to justify 
nudging it one way rather than another with reasons capable of persuading as 
large a constituency of interest as possible.
Meeting these distinctive requirements of judicial decision-making requires a 
professional self-discipline that is not required of those who run for elected office 
or advocate public causes. This kind of self-discipline was well described by 
Benjamin Cardozo, a great American judge and a strong judicial realist, as the 
cultivation of a “judicial temperament” which, as he put it, “will help in some 
degree to emancipate [the judge] from the suggestive power of individual dislike 
and prepossession ... to broaden the group to which his subconscious loyalties are 
due.”2 Note that Cardozo did not give a counsel of perfection: it is only “to some 
degree” that emancipation from prepossession can be achieved. Still, because it 
is imperative that we strive to maintain a degree of credible judiciousness on the 
bench, limits must be imposed on how judges conduct themselves off the bench.
If judges were free off the bench to push for or against changes in public 
policy, or to support or oppose politicians, political parties or governments, then 
it is doubtful that they would maintain any credibility as third party adjudicators. 
Judges will have opponents on virtually any of the public issues on which they 
might take a public stand who will expect a fair hearing when they come to court.
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The same is true of governments, political parties, and other politically active 
organizations that a judge might support or attack in public. If, before being 
appointed, a judge was among the active protagonists of any of these contestants 
in democratic politics, then some of them will have difficulty enough believing that 
the judge is sufficiently impartial to hear their cases, but, if participation in the cut 
and thrust of democratic politics is carried on after appointment, then all 
credibility will be lost.
There is one important exception to the bar against judges participating in the 
public discussion of controversial political issues. The Canadian Judicial Council 
noted this exception in its decision in the Thomas Berger case when it stated that 
“[t]he Judicial Council is of the opinion that members of the Judiciary should 
avoid taking part in controversial political discussions except only in respect of 
matters that directly affect the operation of the courts.”3 On occasion, there may 
be matters concerning, for instance, the adequacy of court resources or the proper 
management of the courts on which judges, especially chief judges and chief 
justices, have a particular responsibility to speak out because no one else will or 
can with the same degree of knowledge and experience. Even in this area, judges 
should endeavour to speak out in a manner that is as non-partisan as possible. 
Support of the judicial branch should not depend on an alliance with any political 
party.
The Berger case points to a further rationale for constraining judges’ off-the- 
bench participation in political controversies. Not only does such participation 
undermine judicial impartiality, but, in the long run, it could threaten the 
independence of the judiciary -  particularly that of a powerful judiciary. An 
independent judiciary would not last long if judges exercised their political muscle 
not only on the bench by overturning policies and laws that in their view violate 
legal rights but also by taking on the politicians in the political arena. That is 
exactly what Justice Berger, as he then was, did when he permitted his critique of 
the first ministers’ constitutional deal to be featured on the op-ed page of the 
Globe and Mail in November, 1981. He took on the leading politicians of the day 
on their turf on an issue of supreme importance to them, and, I might add, on an 
issue — the legitimacy of repatriating the Constitution without Québec’s consent — 
on which the judiciary might well be asked to adjudicate. If judges expect 
politicians to not attack them for the decisions they render qua judges in the 
judicial arena, the quid pro quo is that judges not attack politicians in the political 
arena.
The scope of the constraint on judicial free speech should be no greater than 
necessary. This means it should be confined to politically contentious issues and
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legal questions that may become the subject of adjudication. Outside this 
forbidden area there is plenty of scope for judges to write, speak and otherwise 
express themselves. In the field of legal scholarship they can, and often do, 
contribute to legal and judicial history and biography. Analyses of legal issues of 
contemporary relevance are much more questionable as they will likely be seen as 
committing the judge to a hard position on a particular subject before it is argued 
in court. Addresses or essays by judges re-explaining or “clarifying” decisions they 
have previously made on the bench should be avoided like the plague. Rather 
than clarifying the law, such efforts would more likely set up a confusing set of 
authorities parallel to the judicial decisions themselves.
Then, of course, outside of law there are many realms of expressive activity in 
which judges are entirely free to engage. Art, history, literature, music, 
philosophy, religion, science and sports — in all of these fields, Canadian judges 
have in the past made distinguished -  and undistinguished -  contributions. Let 
us hope they will continue to do so in the future as unfettered in their freedom of 
expression as any other citizen!
In this respect, I have difficulty accepting Rule 8 of the Judicial Code of Ethics 
that was cited in the case concerning Québec’s Judge Andrée Ruffo. According 
to this Rule, “[i]n public, the judge should act in a reserved, serene and courteous 
manner.”4 I have no problem with “courteous” -  we should all try to be 
courteous -  but “reserved” and “serene” are unreasonably restrictive. Off the 
bench, in public, judges should be free to indulge with gusto and, save for their 
time commitments, unreservedly in their recreational and intellectual passions. 
Maintaining judicial impartiality and independence does not require that when 
judges take off their judicial robes they become dull individuals. It requires only 
that when they doff these robes they refrain from entering the fray of political and 
legal controversy -  except when necessary, and in the most judicious manner 
possible, to defend and to explain their own institutions.
The spirit of minimal impairment also requires that limits on judicial free 
speech, for the most part, be enforced in a relatively light and informal manner. 
In the Berger affair, the Canadian Judicial Council, as contrasted with its 
Committee of Inquiry, got this right when it ruled that Justice Berger’s mistake 
was not a ground for removal from office. Judicial independence would be
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seriously at risk if judges were removed for the occasional indiscreet public 
utterance. In most cases, a private or public reprimand by the body responsible 
for judicial discipline should be enough of a sanction. However, if a judge appears 
to ignore such a reprimand and continues to indulge in a public and political 
crusade, then the stiffer sanction of removal would have to be considered. A 
judge who sees no Teason to refrain from engaging in political controversy off the 
bench may not be able to function effectively in a judicial capacity.
Advocates of an unrestricted judicial license to engage in political debate are 
apt to put too much weight on the merit of the causes judges may wish to 
publicize. I find myself sympathetic to the causes advocated by both Justice 
Berger and by Judge Ruffo -  the need for Québec’s consent to constitutional 
changes affecting its powers and the need for better government support of child 
welfare services, respectively. The trouble is that many others are not, and among 
these others are governments and political parties whose members and supporters 
will be coming to court expecting a fair hearing from a third party adjudicator who 
is not numbered among their political opponents.
There can be no doubt that judges have the ability to be eloquent political 
advocates. The judicial office they hold can give added weight to their advocacy. 
Even so, there is no political cause or law reform issue, other than the strength 
and integrity of the judicial system itself, so lacking in effective advocates that it 
requires judicial defenders. Moreover, the very weight of judicial office that is 
seen as enhancing judicial advocacy, giving it that extra measure of credible 
judiciousness, will soon be lost if judges become free-wheeling combatants in the 
give and take of democratic politics.
We collectively, and judges individually, have to decide where citizens who are 
capable of being good judges are to exercise their power. We cannot have a 
powerful judiciary whose members exercise their power both on and off the bench. 
The power of courts to restrict and constrain the most powerful political forces in 
our society depends on those very forces accepting the legitimacy of judicial power. 
That legitimacy would be quickly eroded if judges were to endeavour to wield their 
influence directly in the political arena. Similarly, the citizen who accepts the offer 
of a judicial position must be willing to exchange the right to influence public 
affairs as an ordinary citizen for the judge’s power to shape the rights and legal 
duties of citizens and governments. Disenfranchisement from the normal — and 
central -  political freedoms of democratic citizenship is a self-imposed professional 
obligation that brings with it an extraordinary power. Both the judge’s loss of the 
ordinary citizen’s freedom and gain of extraordinary power are necessary 
conditions of a liberal democracy.
